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Abstract
This paper offers a general equilibrium model that explains how the observed correlations
of money and output fluctuations may come about through endogenously determined
fluctuations in the money multiplier. The model is calibrated to meet long run features of the
U.S. economy (including monetary features) and then subjected to shocks to the Solow residual
following a random process like that observed in U.S. data. The model’s predicted business-
cycle frequency correlations, of both real and nominal variables, share the following features
with U.S. data: i) Mi is positively correlated with real output; ii) the money multiplier and
deposit-to-currency ratio are positively correlated with real output; iii) the price level is
negatively correlated with output [in spite of (i) and (ii)]; iv) the correlation of Mi with
contemporaneous prices is substantially weaker than the correlation ofMi with real output; v)
correlations among real variables are essentially unchanged under different monetary policy
regimes; and vi) real moneybalances are smoother than moneydemand equations would predict.
Although features (i) and (iv) mayhave been considered support fora causal influence ofmoney
on output, the paper demonstrates that they are consistent with an economy in which moneyhas
no suchcausal influence.
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The business cycle observation that motivates our workis the procyclical move-
ment of the nominal money stock, reported most influentially by Friedman and
Schwartz (1963a,b). This correlation between money and output is cited by a
wide range of economists as a compelling suggestion, or even a central macro-
economic fact, that monetary factors play a causal role in output fluctuations.
Consider a recent roundtable on the core ofmacroeconomics: While all care-
fully assert long run monetary neutrality, Taylor (1997) nominates a short-run
trade-offbetween inflation and unemployment as a principleofmacroeconomics;
Eichenbaum (1997), while otherwise minimizing the importance of monetary
fluctuations, nevertheless asserts that “monetary policy is not neutral in the
short run. As an empirical matter, the classic Keynesianand vintage RBC view
about the cyclical ineffectiveness ofmonetary policy has been buried;” Blinder
(1997) places a reliable Phillips curve in a prominent place in the core; and
Blanchard (1997) asserts that “in the short run, higher money growth can in-
crease output.” Elsewhere, Ball and Mankiw (1994) go so far as to divide the
profession into irreconcilable “traditionalists” and “heretics” by one’s beliefs in
‘The remaining panel member, Solow (1997), emphasizes aggregate demand as the source of
output fluctuations but does not mention monetary factors.(their sticky-price explanation for) money’s causal effect on output.
We are not as confident that the existence of a money/output correlation
provesthe effectiveness ofmonetary policy. Other studies intothe nature ofthe
money/output correlationlead one to question whether we should interpret this
correlationas evidence that changes in the moneystock cause changes in output.
First, thevector autoregressions [Sims (1972)] that seemed to establish money’s
predictive power for output have proven very fragile. Vector autoregressions
that include interest rates along with money and output find that interest rates
[Sims (1980) usingnominal interest, Litterman and Weiss (1985) using realrates]
helpto predict both moneyand output, leaving monetary innovations with little
remaining predictive power for output.2
Second, fluctuations in output are observed to be more strongly linked to
fluctuations in inside money — that part of the money stock consisting of de-
posits at financial intermediaries — than to innovations in the monetary base —
the part of the money stock actually controlled by the central bank. [See Ca-
gan (1965), Sims (1972), King and Plosser (1984), Coleman (1996), and Leeper,
2Stock and Watson (1989) find that detrending the money data restores much of the predic-
tive content of monetary data. See Stock and Watson for a summary of investigations into the
money/output correlation. See Cooley and LeRoy (1985) for ageneral critique of making causal
inferences from unrestricted vector autoregressions. Barsky and Miron (1989) find a seasonal
money/output link that, given the exogenous and predictable Christmas and summer, argues
for the endogenity of the money stock.
2Sims, and Zha (1996). This is especially true before 1980, the period of the
greatest money/output correlation.] Movements in broad monetary aggregates
like Mi are more tightly linked to real output than are movements in the base
because of the money multiplier’s tighter links. The money multiplier is an
endogenous variable determined by the public’s relative preference for deposits
and currency. Like most other economic choices, the public’s choice of the com-
position of its money balances is likely to be affected by any number of factors
that fluctuate at business cycle frequencies. Building on the Sargent and Wal-
lace (1982) view of an endogenously fluctuating money stock, Freeman (1986)
and Freeman and Huffman (1991) show how correlations of money and output
fluctuations may come about through endogenously determined fluctuations in
the money multiplier.3
In this paper we ask whether the endogenous nature ofmonetary aggregates
may account in a quantitatively plausible way for the observed correlation of
money and output and other features of the data. To this end we adapt the
endogenous money multiplier model of Freeman and Huffman (1991) into an
3Tobin (1970) also argues that the precedence of the changes in money did not imply that
money changes caused the output changes. His reasoning is that a forward-looking, activist
central bank might cause the money/output correlation by changing the money base to affect
some targeted fluctuating variable that le&ls the cycle. While our explanation shares the spirit
of Tobin’s argument, we concentrate on the endogeneity of the money multiplier because its
links to output fluctuations seem stronger.
3otherwise standard model of a business cycle set off by real disturbances. In
deliberate contrast to monetary models that create a money/output link using
sticky prices or fixed money holdings, all prices and quantities are assumed to
be fully flexible.4 Following the style ofbusiness cycle analysis in Kydland and
Prescott (1982), the model will be calibrated to meet long run features of the
U.S. economy (but now including also monetary features) and then subjected
to shocks to the technology level following a random process like that observed
in U.S. data. The model’s predicted business-cycle frequency correlations, of
both real and nominal variables, is then compared to those of the U.S. data.
We find that the model’s predicted business-cycle frequency correlations share
the following features with U.S. data: i) Mi is positively correlated with real
output; ii) the moneymultiplier and deposit-to-currency ratioare positively cor-
related with real output; iii) the price level is negatively correlated with output
[in spite of (i) and (ii)]; iv) the correlation of Mi with contemporaneous prices
is substantially weaker than the correlation of Mi with real output; v) correla-
tions among real variables are essentially unchanged under different monetary
4Examples of the “sticky” price approach include models assuming long-term fixed nominal
contracts [following Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979)] or “menu” costs of price adjustments [fol-
lowing Mankiw (1985)]. Examples of the second approach, often called “limited participation”
models, assume that some economic agents are temporarily unable toalter their money balances
at will [following Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)].
4policy regimes; and vi) real money balances are smoother than money demand
equations would predict.
Others, notably Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), have consid-
ered an endogenous moneymultiplier in calibrated models of the business cycle.
Their computational experiments differ from ours in one distinct way. In their
model, the endogenous money multiplier is introduced into a model that already
features links between money and real output generated by some stickiness or
incompleteness in markets (specifically, the assumption that households cannot
immediately adjust their money balances). As a result, while of interest for
other reasons, their model cannot be used to explore fully the task we have set
for ourselves — to generate the money/output correlation in a model without
resorting to stickiness in prices or economic decisions.
Coleman (1996) takes an approach closer to our philosophy. He employs a
model featuring an endogenous moneymultiplier in which he postulates separate
transactions costs for consumption and investment purchases. The model con-
tains 28 parameters ofwhich 12 are calibrated and 16, including ninetransaction-
cost parameters, are estimated for the period 1959Q1-1994Q2 using simulated
moments estimation. While his approach produces interesting insights on the
sourcesofmoney-output association, including lead-lagrelationships, and on the
5extent to which they can be reconciled with the model, the model’s complexity
reduces the transparency of its findings.
In this paper, we take a decidedly more parsimonious approach. We assume
that consumption goods can be purchased using either currency or bank de-
posits. Only the minimal number (two) oftransaction costs are assumed. One
is a Baumol (1952)-Tobin (1956) cost ofacquiring moneybalances, necessary to
determine the demand for money and make endogenous the velocity of money.
Specifically, we assume that money balancescan be replenished during each pe-
riod at a cost of leisure time for each instance such a transaction takes place.
The other is a fixed cost of using deposits, necessary to determine the division
of money balances into currency and deposits. In equilibrium, deposits, being
backed by capital, offer a better rate of return than currency. Therefore the
fixed cost ofusing deposits allows a demand for currency despite its low rate of
return. Smaller purchases are made with currency and the larger ones with de-
posits. Facing these two costs and other factors that may vary over the business
cycle, households make decisions that determine the velocity of money and the
money multiplier.
In the next section, we outline our model environment, derive the stationary
equilibrium, and discuss the model’s calibration. In Section 3, we describe the
6model’s properties when subjected to production technology shocks under a
fixed growth rate offiat money and then two alternative stochastic processesfor
money growth.
2. The theoretical framework
2.1. The environment:
Eachof a large number ofinfinitely lived identièal households is endowed with a
stock ofcapital in the initial period (period 0) and one unit oftime in each period
t 0. Time can be used for leisure, labor, or the conducting of transactions.
There is a continuum ofgood types indexed byj with 0 ~ j ~ 1. The utility
of the representative household is the following function of its consumption of
goods of each type [ct(j)] and of leisure (d~ ) in each period t 0:
E>/3tu [mm(~~) ,d~] (2.1)
The functionu(.,.) is assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions and to beincreas-
ing in each argument, quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable.
A singleproductionprocess produces capital and consumption goods ofevery
type j. Output at t is a constant-returns-to-scale function of the two inputs
7to production at t — capital (k~)and labor (ii): ztf(kt, it), where zt denotes
the technology level. In every period fraction 6 of the existing capital stock
depreciates after production (0 < 6 < 1). The capital per household available
for production in period t therefore equals the sum of capital created in period
t — 1 (~i~) and that part of the previous period’s capital stock which has not
depreciated:
= i~_, + (1— 6)k~,. (2.2)
The technology level evolves according to
Zt =pzj_i+St, (2.3)
where the ~‘s are normally distributed with positive mean and standard devia-
tion a.
In addition to capital, two other assets are available to households — fiat
money and bank deposits. Fiat money, uniquely issued by the government, is
unbacked, intrinsically useless, and costless to exchange. The stock offiat money
(in units called dollars) at the end of any period t is Aft, with M~ =
Changes in the stock of fiat money are financed by lump sum subsidies of xt
8units of fiat money to each household. The government budget constraint is
= (~ —1)M~_,. (2.4)
Bank deposits are loans to competitive financial intermediaries that use the
proceeds to invest in capitaland reserves offiatmoney. Thegovernment requires
that financialintermediaries hold reserves ofatleast 0 dollarsworthoffiatmoney
for each dollar held in deposits. The use of deposits to make a purchase incurs
a fixed cost of ‘y goods for each type of good purchased using deposits.5 (This
might be thought ofas a check-clearing cost or a cost ofverifying the identity of
the person writing a check or making a withdrawal.) Deposits made in period t
pay competitively determined interest in period t +i .
The consumption ofeachhousehold must be purchasedwith money balances
chosen at the beginning of the period. Any combination of deposits and fiat
money may be chosen to satisfy this requirement, but the ratio of deposits to
currency chosen at the beginning ofthe period must be maintained throughout
the period. If these money balances are replenished ~t times in period t, then nt
5The assumption of a fixed cost of deposits is taken from Prescott (1987) and has been
used to endogenize currency demand in Freeman and Huffman (1991) and Schreft (1992). In
a growing economy the assumption that the cost is fixed in goods implies a gradual shift from
currency to deposits (as observed domestically) over time.
9dollars worthofconsumption goods can be purchased foreach dollar ofbalances
held. The replenishment of money balances (a trip to the asset market) uses
ç5 units of time so that the total time spent on transactions equals ~nt. A
household begins each period with the money balances it chose in the previous
period. Essentially this transactions technology is that introduced by Baumol
(1952) and Tobin (1956) but with a transaction cost payable in time as proposed
by Karni (1973).
The requirement that consumption be purchased using money functions like
the commonly assumed “cash-in-advance” constraint in that the level of con-
sumption determinesthe demand for money balances, but with three differences
worth noting. First, current consumption is purchased by current money bal-
ances, not the money balances acquired in the previous period. Second, the
velocity of money, as represented by nt, is not fixed but is determined endoge-
nously. Third, bank deposits as well as fiat money may be used to purchase
consumption, and the ratio of deposits to fiat money is freely chosen.
2.2. Equilibrium:
An equilibrium consists of the following: i) households choose consumption,
labor, and asset holdings taking as given prices and rates of return; ii) firms
10maximize profits taking factor prices as given; lii) firms and banks earn zero
profits; and iv) markets clear.
Let us examine household choices in several steps, starting with the choices
of the composition of consumption and money balances. For a given desired
level of total period t consumption c~, the Leontief-type instantaneous utility
function, u {min(~) ,djj, induces agents to distribute consumption over the
various goods types according to the optimizing rule
ej(j) = 2jc. (2.5)
Integrating (2.5) fromj = 0 to 1 will verify that total consumption equals c~.
Substitution of this optimal rule (2.5) into the household’s utility function
(2.1) yields a more standard objective function
~/3tu(c~dt) (2.6)
Consider next the household’s choice ofthe composition of money balances
for a given c~’.Foreachtype ofgood purchased, ahousehold must decide whether
deposits or fiat money offerthe more attractive rate ofreturn, net oftransaction
11costs. Deposits, however, have a fixed cost of use so that, defining ~, as the
real gross rate ofreturn paid by banks in periodt+1 on deposits made in period
t and rt+, as the real gross rate of return on nonintermediated assets acquired
at t, the real rate of return net oftransaction costs for nt purchases of size ct(j)
is
rt+i — , (2.7)
an increasing function of the size of the purchase (an increasing function of
j). Because of the fixed cost of using deposits, the deposit rate of return net of
transaction costs goes to negative infinity asj goesto zero; i.e., deposits become
less desirable as the purchase size decreases. In contrast, the nominal gross rate
of return offiat money is always unity no matter how manyunits arepurchased
because it incurs no fixed cost per transaction. This implies that there exists
some j~ below which currency is preferred to deposits. In the case of perfect
foresight (or certainty equivalence) this j’~ is given by the value ofj at which
currency and deposits offer the same rate ofreturn:
- ‘yrt+int p~
— = —. (2.8)
2jc~ Pt+i
We will concentrate on the interesting casein which both currency and deposits
12are used as money (j* <1).
INSERT FIGURE
Recall that money balances are replenished nt times each period. Then,
denoting nominal household deposits by h~ and nominal fiat money balances by
mt, we can usej~ to express the demand for each type of money as the values
ofh~and mt satisfying
flj~ =Jc~(j)dj =J2jc~di= (i — ~*2) c~, (2.9)
= f ct(j)dj =f2jc~dj = j*2c~. (2.10)
Let us now turn to the constraints on the household’s decision. The time
constraint is
1 =i~+d~+n~~, (2.11)
which divides the available time into labor (it), leisure (di), and the number of
trips to the bank (flt). Let usdefine Wt asthe (real) wage paid to a unit oflabor,
and aj as the level of nonmonetary assets acquired by the end of period t. We
13can now write the agent’s goods budget constraint:
~ mj_i+xt h~ mj
wtit+rtat_i -I- + =c~+at+—+ —-4-’y(l —j), (2.12)
Pt-i Pt Pt Pt
which states that wages plus the return from the household’s (nonmonetary and
monetary) assets must equal its consumption, its new asset holdings, and its
transaction costs.
We can nowexpress the agent’s perfect foresight problem as the maximiza-
tion of (2.6) subject to the constraints (2.9)-(2.12). After using 2.12 and 2.11 to
substitute for c and d~,the household’s constrained problem may be expressed
as the choice of aj, h~,mt, j~, nt, and i,~to maximize
~ ~+ nat_i ++ mti+ ~t —— at —— — ‘y(l — j), 1 — I~ — fltc~]
(2.13)





We’ll denote its derivatives with respect to the first and second arguments
14as u0 and ud, respectively. The first order conditions resulting from the choice
of at, h~,mt, j, nt,and i,~are respectively
u,~ (ci, d~)
rt+i = ,~ * , (2.14)
pu~ (~+i, at+i)
u0(c~,d~) flt~t
= Tt+i + ~t+luc(c~+i,dt+i)~ (2.15)
u0(c~,d~) —P t _____________
~ ~ d~+1)— Pt+i + ~ ~ d~+1)’ (2.16)
= ~ ~ (2.17)
I~t-~-+ r~ = ,t3’~u~j (cr, di), (2.18)
~ (c~,d~) = Ud (ci, di). (2.19)
It immediately follows from (2.14)-(2.17) that in an equilibrium in which all
assetsare held, the assets with the lowest transaction costs must have the lowest
equilibrium returns; i.e.,
rt+i > f~+i> ~. (2.20)
Pt+i
The bank’s problem is easy to describe. Banks accept deposits, investing
them in a portfolio of capital and fiat money reserves. In equilibrium, capital’s
15rate of return exceeds that offiat money (Tt+i > -i), ensuring that banks will
not hold more than the legal minimumrequirement ofreserves (0 for each dollar
of deposits). Free-entry among zero-cost, zero-net-worth banks requires that
depositors are offered the rate of return received by the banks’ assets:
= (1 — 0)n~+i+ 0—~—. (2.21)
Pt+i
The firm’s problem is entirelystandard. Profit maximization by competitive
firms operating under constant returns to scale induces a representative firm
to use capital k~and labor i,~until the marginal product of each equals the
competitively determined rental rateof that input (respectively, lrt and Wt):
Ztfk(kt, it) = lrt, (2.22)
ztfz(kt,it) = w,~. (2.23)
These conditions also ensure that constant-returns-to-scale firms earn no eco-
nomic profits. The effective gross real rate ofreturn on capital, rt , is therefore
rt =ir~+(l—5), (2.24)
16The clearing of the asset market for capital requires that the capital stock
per household must equal the sum of capital held directly by each household
and capital held by banks on behalf ofeach household:
k~+1=at+(1—0)~. (2.25)
Pt
The clearing of the market for fiat money requires that the stock of fiat
money equal the combined stocks ofcurrency and reserves:
M~ = mt + 0hz. (2.26)
The total money stock, the sum ofnominal deposits and currency, is
M1~ = mt + h~, (2.27)
which, using (2.26) canbe written as the product of the monetary base and the
money multiplier
M1~ = M~1+ h~(1 —0) (2.28)
mt + 0h~
The money multiplier is closely related to the deposit-to-currencyratio, ht/mt,
17but with an adjustment for that part of the base that serves as reserves.
2.3. The behavior of money over the cycle
Let us illustrate the workings of the model by describing the response of mone-
tary variables to a positive technology shock. The increased output from a pos-
itive technology shockleads to an increased desire forconsumption. In response
the household wishes to increase both realmoney balances, which depresses the
price level, and trips to the bank to refresh money balances, which increases the
velocity of money, other things equal. The positive technology shock has the
added effect of increasing the marginalproduct of labor and thus the opportu-
nity cost of the time spent on transactions. This further increases the demand
for real money balances but reduces trips to the bank.
A positive technology shock affects also the composition of money balances.
Theresulting increase in desired consumption increases the size ofall purchases.
Because the deposits are preferred forlarger purchases, households increase the
ratio of deposits to currency.6 This increases the money multiplier and thus
Mi. To the extent that it reduces the demand for currency, this switch in
the composition of money balances also increases the price level, other things
6One might loosely think of these largepurchases as purchases of durablegoods, which are
generally large and thus purchased using deposits.
18equal. Anyincrease in the nominal interest ratewillfurther encourage household
preferences for deposits over currency.
2.4. Steady State
At this point let us look for an equilibrium that is stationary in c~, ~, ~, j~,
nt, and it, starting with the rates of return. From (2.14), the rate of return on
unintermediated capital in steady state require~.
= ~. (2.29)
From the budget constraint (2.12) and the clearing ofthe market for fiat money
(2.26), the steady-state rate of return offiat money is
—~—=--. (2.30)
Pt+i e
It follows directly from these two rates of return and (2.21) that the real gross
rate ofreturn on deposits is
= (1 — 0)~ + 0~. (2.31)






we can express the first-order conditions (2.15)-(2.18) in steady state as
= ~+ u~ (c~,d) ~ (2.34)
1 1 i.t~n
= ~•+ u0(c*,d)/3’ (2.35)
= ~+‘yu~(c~d) (2.36)
?7+/L Ud(C,d). (2.37)
These conditions, together with the stationary versions of (2.4), (2.12), (2.19),
and (2.22)—(2.26 ), define the steady state.
203. Quantitative Analysis
When values have been assignedto the model’s parameters, a computational ex-
periment proceeds by computing from the model many independent time paths,
each of the same length as those for the data period for the United States with
which the model is contrasted. As is also done for the data, the model’s time
series, except for interest rates, are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
We refer to each variable’s deviation from the trend as the cyclical component.
The model’s cyclical behavior can then be summarized in the form of a set of
statistics, such as standard deviations and correlation coefficients.
3.1. Model Calibration
The parameters of preferences and productive technology are calibrated to sat-
isfy certain steady-state relations. In the steadystate, investment is one-quarter
of output, so that, with a depreciation rate of0.025, the ratio of capital to an-
nual output is 2.5. Theproduction-function is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas
form ztkt0~itl~. The parameter a is calibrated so that the labor share of na-
tional income is 0.64. The autocorrelation coefficient p in the technology level
process is set equal to 0.95 with a standard deviation a of its innovations of
0.0076. The utility function is assumed to have the form ~ {(c~ (~4)1c] i V
21with 0 < c < 1, ~1 > 0. Setting the average allocation of households’ time (net
of sleep and personal care) to market activity equal to 0.30 restricts the value
of the utility function’s share parameter, c, to be 0.33. We choose u = 2. The
reserve-requirement ratio, 0, is set equal to 0.10.
We make no attempt here to obtain independent values of the key para-
meters ‘y and ~. Instead, we calibrate them to steady-state values of the de-
posit/currency ratio and the share of capital that is intermediated. In deter-
mining the deposit/currency ratio, we exclude a rough estimate of the currency
held abroad or associated with unlawful activities. Estimates of the former
currently range from two-thirds to three-quarters. An indication is that high-
denomination currency (100- and 50-dollar bills) by 1995 had risen to over 70
percent ofthe outstanding currency. Ifwe divide the deposits portion of MI. by
one-thirdofcurrency, the resulting figures rangefrom about 12 early in our sam-
ple to about 7 late in the sample. The figure one-third used in that calculation
surely is too low for the early period but probably too high for recent years. As
a compromise, we selected a deposit/currency ratio of 9 for our computational
experiments. Dividingthe nonreserve portionof Mi by the capital stock (about
2.5 times annual GDP) yields values ranging from about four to six percent.
We chose 0.05 as our steady-state value. The resulting parameter values are
22= 0.0060 and ~, = 0.00076. In our computational experiments, the average
aggregate resource use associated with the fixed cost ‘y works out to be 0.41
percent of the model’s GDP. The time per replenishment implied by the value
of q5 is approximately one hour. (Note that ~ represents not the cost of going
to the ATM machine but the cost ofreplenishing all deposit and cash balances
from nonmonetary assets.)
3.2. Quantitative Findings
We start by examiningthe model’sbehaviorunder two simple monetary policies,
each with an average annual inflation rate of 3 percent. Under the first, policy
A, the growth rate of fiat money is fixed at 3% in every period. Under the
second, policy B, serially uncorrelated shocks have been added to the supply of
fiat money, with a standard deviation of 0.5 percent.
The model displays interesting comovements among its variables. Table 1
presents contemporaneouscorrelations with output.
23Mi P Mi/MO Mi/P PY/Mi R~ C I L
Policy A 1 -.49 1 .98 .52 -0.06 .96 .99 .99
Policy B .87 -.13 1 .98 .52 -0.06 .95 .99 .99
Table 1: Contemporaneous correlations with output
for two serially uncorrelated monetary policies.
Notice first that Mi is positively correlated with real output. Under Pol-
icy A in which there is no randomness in the growth rate of fiat money, it is
obvious that the movement of Mi comes from the reaction of the deposit-to-
currency ratio to the technology shock. A positive technology shock encourages
the use of deposits because it increases both the return to the capital backing
deposits and the size of consumption purchases. Because technology shocks are
assumed to be the only source of randomness, the correlation is very high. Un-
der Policy B, with randomness in the monetary base, Mi and the pricelevel are
less tightly correlated with real output, although output’s correlations with the
money multiplier and real sector variables are essentially unchanged.
A second interesting pattern is the countercyclical behavior of prices. Al-
though a pro-cyclical increase in the money multiplier implies a decrease in the
demand for fiat money which, other things equal, implies a higher price level,
24the increase in desired consumption from a positive technology shock increases
the demand for both forms of money, decreasing the price level. In these com-
putational experiments as in the actual data [see Kydland and Prescott (1990)
and Cooley and Ohanian (1991)], this second effect dominates.
In Table 2 we present correlations between Mi and other endogenous vari-
ables for policy B, with serially uncorrelated randomness in the growth rate of
the monetary base.
GDPP C I Mi/MOP~
Policy B .87 .34 .87 .85 .87 -.07
Table 2: Contemporaneous correlations with Mi
for a random but serially uncorrelated monetary policy.
Several patterns observed here are consistent with a business cycle driven by
monetary fluctuations. Nominal money balances are positively correlated with
contemporaneous consumption and investment aswell as labor and future capi-
tal. Notice too that the correlation of Mi with contemporaneous prices (.34) is
substantially weaker than thecorrelation ofMi with realoutput (.87). Looking
at these correlations without knowing the underlying economic structure, one
might be tempted to imagine that they come from an economy in which mon-
25etary shocks are not offset by price level changes but have a causal effect on
output. These correlations, however, are found in a model driven by technology
shocks featuring complete flexibility in prices and money balances.
Consider now the more realistic assumption that shocks to the growth rate
Qf the monetary base are serially correlated. Consider in particular a first-order
autoregressive process with an autoregression parameter of 0.7 and a standard
deviation of.2, which we will call policy C. In this case, positive innovations to
the current rate of growth ofthe monetary base signal an increased probability
ofhigh growthin next period’s monetary base. As a result agents will anticipate
a high rate of inflation, inducing them to switch some of their money balances
from currency to capital-backed deposits, stimulating output.7 This stimulus is
negligible, however. The standard deviation of output is the same (i.33) under
both policies. Comparing policies B and C in Table 3 we do not find much
of a difference in the correlations with output of real variables, despite some
differences in the correlationsof nominal variables.
7This effect of serially correlated monetary expansions was proposed by Lacker (1988) and
Freeman and Huffman (1991).
26MiP ~ IL
Policy B .87 -.13 1 .98 .52 -0.06 .95 .99 .99
Policy C .81 -.1 .92 .98 .52 -0.05 .94 .99 .99
Table 3: Correlations with output,
with and withoutserial correlation in monetary base growth.
In Tables 4 and 5 we compare the model’scorrelations with output and with
Mi respectively to those of the U.S. before and after 1980.~
MiP ~~M0~C IL R~
Policy C .81 -.1 .98 .52 .01 .92 .94 .99 .99 -0.05
U.S. 59:1-79:3 .70 -.78 .81 .45 .46 .46 .89 .90 .86 .29
U.S. 79:4-95:4 .09 -.56 .26 .51 .34 .02 .89 .89 .91 .48
Table 4: correlations with output
8The correlations are calculated from Citibase data. Labor, L, is hours from the establish-
ment survey. The price level, P, is the GNP deflator. Consumption, C, is total consumption
and investment, I, is total investment. A case could be made that, to be consistent with our
calibration, high-denomination currency should be subtracted from Mi. As its movements are
largely uncorrelated with the U.S. business cycle, however, and our focus is on correlations be-
tween money andoutput, we made no attempt to do so. Our sample period starting in 1959:1
is based on availability of quarterly monetary aggregates.
27CI P ~R
Policy C .82 .78 .47 .91 .12
U.S. data 59:1-79:3 .63 .66 -.50 .67 .37
U.S. data 79:4-95:4 .27 .13 -.42 .94 -.48
Table 5: correlations with Mi
Our simple model generally matches the signs of these correlations of the
real data. In particular, we see in Table 4 that output is positively correlated
with output and real balances even though prices are countercyclical.
The model also displays a correlation of Mi with contemporaneous prices
that is substantially weaker than the correlation of Mi with real output. The
model does not go as far as the actual data, however, which displays in Table 5
a negative correlation between Mi and the price level. A negative correlation is
a possibility consistent with the mechanicsofour theory: positive output shocks
can drive Mi up (through an increase in the money multiplier) while it drives
the price level down (through an increased demand for money). As calibrated,
however, our simple model displays a price level that is not sufficiently counter-
cyclical for this outcome (see Table 4).
From Table 4 we see that the correlation ofoutput and the money multiplier
28is muchgreater in the model than in thedata. An assumption ofthe model made
for tractability is that the same number ofpurchases are made regardless ofthe
desired level of consumption. When more consumption is desired, a household
simply makes larger purchases, increasing the use of deposits and the money
multiplier. The response of the money multiplier (and thus the price level)
to output fluctuations would therefore be less (more like the data) if agents
increased both the size and quantity ofpurchases when consumption increases.9
The model’s correlations (and, we believe, its assumptions about monetary
structures) are much closer in magnitude to those in the real U.S. economy
before 1980 (the period of much of the empirical work on money-output cor-
relations) than to those after 1980. The financial deregulation of the 1980’s
brought large changes in what could be used as money and a major change in
monetary policy. Most relevant to our story about the money multiplier are the
large and fluctuating flows of U.S. currency to foreign countries, especially the
former Soviet Union, in this period.’0 As Gavin and Kydland (1996) point out,
the various monetary changes in the post-1980 era led to dramatic changes in
9We did not redesign our model to allow fora variable number of purchases because it would
add complexity to the choice of the composition of money balances in a way that we cannot
imagine how to calibrate.
‘°SeePorter and Judson (1996) for evidence concerning the flows of currency to the former
Soviet Union. We thank Philip Jefferson for bringing this to our attention.
29the variance and correlations of Mi and other monetary variables (though not
to real behavior). Explaining the changes brought by the 1980’s is an important
project for future work by monetary economists of all persuasions but beyond
the scope ofa model with only a single type ofintermediated asset, a monetary
policy without targeting, and no foreign demand for dollars.
Another area for exploration is the possible endogeneity of the monetary
base. It is clear from Table 4 that even in the period before 1980 the correlation
ofthe monetary base and output is stronger in thedata than inour experimental
economy with its exogenous random monetary base (although in both the pre-
1980 data and the model it is weaker than the correlation of Mi and output).
A policy by the Federal Reserve of changing the monetary base in reaction
to economic events (for example, a policy of stabilizing the price level) might
account for this correlation. Wewish, however, to keep the focus of this present
paper squarely on the endogeneity of the money multiplier.
3.3. The excessive smoothness of real money balances
A puzzle for monetary theory is the observed persistence of money holdings
in the face of fluctuations in income and nominal interest rates. Lucas (1994)
presents the puzzle in the following way. He first shows that unitary income
30elasticity accounts well for the trend of Mi since 1900. Plotting the money-
income ratio versus a nominal interest rate, he finds that an interest elasticity
of -0.5 fits the data better that either -0.3 or -0.7. Using time series data on
nominal output and interest rates, Lucas then calculates predicted Mi from the
relation rn/p = Ayn’12, where m, p, y , r and A represent respectively nominal
money balances (Mi), the price level, real output, the nominal interest rate
and a scale parameter. Lucas finds that the actual time series of Mi is much
smoother than the predicted time series.
For our economy under policy C, the average percentage standard deviation
of cyclical real Mi is 1.36, while that predicted by the relation used by Lucas
is 1.21.11 The artificial time series generated by our model thus display more
smoothness than would be predicted by a conventional moneydemand function.
This apparent “stickiness” of money demand is observed even though money
balances are completely flexible in the model. What looks like stickiness of
moneydemandcomes fromthe endogeneityofMi through the money multiplier.
Using the Lucas notation, rn/py fails to fluctuate as much as would be predicted
from long run behavior because endogenous changes in the total money supply
“Under policies Aand B, the difference between predicted and “actual” standard deviations
is of the same magnitude.
31(m) offset fluctuations in nominal income (py) at the business cycle frequency.
4. Conclusion
As its name suggests, muchofthe research inthe real businesscycle tradition has
left aside monetary factors whenstudying sources and effects of macroeconomic
fluctuations. Attention to monetary phenomena, however, is now increasing.
Motivated by observed correlations between real output and nominal vari-
ables like the total money supply, efforts have been made to model monetary
innovations as a source ofreal fluctuations at the frequency of the business cycle.
To get nominal variables to matter for real output, two lines of work have been
developed that deviate from the cornerstone of classical economics and the real
business cycle approach: the assumption that relative prices and the decisions
of rational economic agents can react to any exogenous disturbance. Instead,
these two lines of work assume that either nominal prices or nominal money
balances are assumed to be unchangeable for some period.
In this paper we attempt to address the observed correlations of nominal
money balances and real output while imposing no rigidity in prices or agent
choices. This intentionally simple equilibrium model demonstrates that onemay
observe correlations between nominal monetary aggregates and real output even
32in economies in which rigidities are not imposed.
Money in the model has no causal effect on the decisions that affect real
output. The key to the monetary correlations displayed by the model lies in the
endogeneity of the money supply that results from the households’ choices of
the composition of their money balances in response to variables that fluctuate
over the business cycle. These endogenous monetary responses yield not only
the sought-after money/output correlation but also the sticky prices and money
balances that other models of money and output impose by assumption.
We do not offer this analysis as a definitive affirmation ofcomplete monetary
neutrality. Indeed, in our model economy, shocks to required reserves or serially
correlated shocks to the monetary base have an influence on output. Other real
effects of monetary policies are certainly conceivable. We offer arather tractable
way in which an endogenous money multiplier can be introduced into models
considering a variety monetary phenomena, policies, or links to the real sector.
Our purposes in this exercise are two. First we demonstrate that the en-
dogeneity of the money stock may significantly contribute to the observed cor-
relations between nominal and real variables and therefore must be taken into
account. Only after allowing for the endogeneity of the money stock can one
begin to make a case for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
33Second, we show with our example that restrictions on the flexibility of
agent choices or pricesare not required to generate a money/output correlation.
Assumptions of inflexible prices and decisions pre-judge the effectiveness and
desirability of policy by allowing the monetary authority to make the nominal
adjustments that agents are assumed unable to make. Recent efforts to model
monetary phenomena often seem to have granted themselves an exemption on
the grounds of necessity from the classical standard of adjustable prices and
quantities. Our work demonstrates that this exemption is not necessary to ad-
dress the monetary data. We hope that those who disagree with us as to the
source ofthese monetary phenomenawillreturn to thedebate with explicit mod-
els in which the necessityofgovernment intervention is not built intoconstraints
on agent behavior.
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Figure: The composition of money balances